Cole v. Rush [DISSENT] by Carter, Jesse W.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions The Jesse Carter Collection
10-28-1955
Cole v. Rush [DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Torts Commons
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Cole v. Rush [DISSENT]" (1955). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 183.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/183
Oct. 1955] CoLE v. RusH 345 
{45 C.2d 345; 289 P.2d 4501 
A. No. 22864. In Bank. Oct. 28, 1955.] 
DOROTHEA COLE et al., Appellants, v. PAUL RUSH 
et al., Defendants; PRANK VAN STONE, Respondent. 
[1) Intoxicating Liquors- Civil Liability- Torts.-The common 
law gives no remedy for injury or death following the mere 
sale of liquor to the ordinary man, either on the theory that 
it is a direct wrong or on the ground that it is negligence, 
which imposes a legal liability on the seller for damages re-
sulting from the intoxication. 
[2a, 2b] !d.-Civil I,iability-Torts.---"1\Iere knowledge by a sellPr 
of intoxicating liquor of the belligerent disposition of the pur-
chaser when he was intoxicated does not establish the sale of 
the liquor as a proximate cause of injuries subsequently re-
ceived by the purchaser because of his intoxication. 
[3] !d.-Civil Liability-Torts.-In the absence of a statute to the 
contrary, the sale of intoxicating liquor is not the proximate 
cause of injuries subsequently received by the purchaser be-
cause of his intoxication. 
[4] Courts-District Courts of Appeal-Finality of Judgment.-
A judgment of a District Court of Appeal, after denial of a 
hearing by the Supreme Court, stands as a decision of a court 
of last resort in this state until and unless disapproved by the 
Supreme Court or until change of the law by legislative action, 
although denial of a hearing is not the equivalent of express 
approval by the Supreme Court. 
[5] Intoxicating Liquors-Civil Liability-Torts.-If a man who 
is injured by reason of his intoxicated state may not himself 
recover from the one who provided the liquor, his survivors 
may not recover in a wrongful death action. 
[6] Id.-Civil Liability-Torts.-A cause of action for wrongful 
death is not stated by a complaint alleging that decedent 
was a frequent patron of defendants' cafe, that he was well 
known by defendants to be of quiet demeanor normally and 
to be belligerent, pugnacious and quarrelsome when intoxi-
cated, that prior to the date in question his widow had re-
quested d0fendants not to sell liquor to decedent in sufficient 
[1] Right of action at common law for damages to plaintiff in 
consequence of sale of intoxicating liquor to another, note, 130 
A.L.R. 357. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Alcoholic Beverages, § 3; Am.Jur., 
Intoxicating Liquors, § 607 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-3, 5, 6, 10, 11] Intoxicating Liquors, 
§ 110; [4] Courts, § 157; [7] Constitutional Law, § 78; [8] Stat-
utes, § 185; [9] Statutes, § 183. 
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quantity to allow him to be intoxicated, that because of liquor 
sold on such date he became intoxicated, engaged in a fight 
with another patron, and struck his head on the pavement 
when he fell from a blow, resulting in his immediate death. 
[7] Constitutional Law-Distribution of Powers of Government--
Judicial Interference.-For the Supreme Court to hold that 
plaintiffs stated a cause of action by averring facts which 
establish that no cause of action arose either by statute or by 
common law as the same existed at the time of the events relied 
on would at least constitute a departure from its constitution;:J! 
function and an encroachment on that of the Legislature. 
[8] Statutes--Presumptions- Legislative Knowledge.-In adopt-
ing legislation the Legislature is presumed to have had knowl-
edge of existing domestic judieial decisions and to have enacted 
and amended statutes in the light of such decisions as have a 
direct bearing on them. 
[9] !d.-Presumptions-Legislative Intent.-'l'he failure of the 
Legislature to change the law in a particular respect when the 
subject is generally before it and changes in other respects are 
made is indicative of an intent to leave the law as it stands in 
the aspects not amended. 
[10] Intoxicating Liquors- Civil Liability- Torts.-Though the 
Legislature has made numerous changes in statutes govern-
ing the sale, use and furnishing of intoxicating liquors and 
in statutes haviug to do with various aspects of tort liability, 
it has not adopted a statute inconsistent with the common law 
so far as concerns a remedy for injury or death following the 
furnishing of liquor to the ordinary man, and under such cir-
cumstances the legislative intent appears to be to maintain, 
rather than to depart from, the pertinent common law, and the 
common law is the controlling law in such case. ( Civ. Code, 
§ 22.2.) 
[11] !d.-Civil Liability-Torts.-It is established both bv the 
common law and the decisional law in this state that a~ to a 
competent person it is the voluntary consumption, not the sale 
or gift, of intoxicating liquor that is the proximate cause of 
injury from its use; that the competent person voluntarily 
consuming intoxicating liquor contributes directly to any in-
jury caused thereby; and that contributory negligence of the 
decedent bars recovery by his heirs or next of kin in a wrong-
ful death action. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Philbrick McCoy, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for damages for wrongful death. Judgment for 
defendant on sustaining demurrer to an amended complaint 
without leave to amend, affirmed. 
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John C. Stevenson and Lionel Richman for Appellants. 
Parker, Stanbury, Reese & McGee, J. H. Peckham and 
C. G. W. McGee for Respondent. 
MacFarlane, Schaefer & Haun, E. J. Caldecott, Trippet, 
Yoakum & 'fhomas and Lyle C. Newcomer as 
Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondent. 
SCHAUER, J.-In this wrongful death action plaintiffs, 
-vvho are the surviving widow and minor children of James 
Bernard Cole, deceased, seek to recover damages for the 
allegedly negligent furnishing of intoxicating liquor to the 
deceased, which plaintiffs claim proximately caused his death. 
They appeal from an adverse judgment entered upon the 
sustaining of a demurrer to their amended complaint, without 
leave to amend. We have concluded that the trial court 
correctly held that the complaint does not state facts sufficient 
to constitute a cause of action, and that the judgment should 
be affirmed. 
The material allegations of the amended complaint are 
that defendants own and operate an establishment known as 
the Tropic Isl!~ in which "intoxieating liquors are sold and 
furnished to the public for consumption on the premises''; 
on October 13, 1950, James Bernard Cole was a patron of 
the 'rropic Isle and defendants ''did sell, furnish, give, and 
cause to be sold, furnished and given'' to him alcoholic 
beverages which he drank; immediately before he came "to 
the premises of the defendants . . . Cole was not intoxicated 
by reason of the use of alcoholic beverages,'' but he ''did 
drink said alcoholic beverages so sold, furnished and given 
until and after . . [he] became intoxicated.'' Cole had 
patronized the Tropic Isle on numerous occasions and was 
well known to defendants, who also knew that he was ''nor-
mally of quiet demeanor but that when . . intoxicated he 
became belligerent, pugnacious and quarrelsome"; on nu-
merous prior occasions plaintiff widow had requested de-
fendants "not to sell or furnish intoxicating beverages to 
said James Bernard Cole sufficient! to allow him to become 
intoxicated thereon" (italics added), but defendants refused 
1By what standards or tests the defendants on any occasion might 
determine the amount which properly could be furnished is not dis-
closed. 
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to comply with such ; reason of said intoxica-
tion, and by reason of said alcoholic beverages so unlawfully 
sold, furnished or ... and as a proximate result 
thereof, ... Cole became belligerent, pugnacious and quarrel-
some ... Cole did thereafter on said date quarrel with 
one Pranklin IJeonard . . . Cole and . . . I,eonard did en-
gage in fisticuffs; ... Cole was struck . Leonard and 
did fall to the pavement, striking his head against the con-
crete, by reason of which . Cole suffered a subarachnoid 
hemorrhage, traumatic, and died immediately from the effects 
of said blow'' ; at the time of his death Cole ''was an able-
bodied man of the age of 39 years,'' earning approximately 
$4,000 a year. 
Defendant Prank Van Stone, alleged to be one of the 
owners of the Tropic Isle, demurred to the amended complaint 
on the ground that it fails to state facts sufficient to con-
stitute a cause of action. By way of particularizing its 
insufficiency he specifies, among other things. that the com-
plaint shows on its face that decedent's injuries were caused 
or contributed to by fault and negligence on decedent's part 
and that it cannot be determined in what manner any acts 
of the defendant were the proximate cause of the alleged 
injuries. Pollowing the hearing upon the demurrer and the 
statement of counsel for plaintiffs that ''he cannot further 
amend,'' the court sustained the demurrer without leave to 
amend, and judgment was entered accordingly. 
[1] The general rule of the common law as to tort liability 
arising out of the sale of intoxicating beverages is stated in 
30 American Jurisprudence 573, section 607: "The common 
law gives no remedy for injury or death following the mere 
sale of liquor to the ordinary man, either on the theory that 
it is a direct wrong or on the ground that it is negligence, 
which imposes a legal liability on the seller for damages 
resulting from the intoxication." (For examples of cases fol-
lowing the rule see: Hitson v. Dwyer (1943), 61 Cal.App.2d 
803, 808 [143 P.2d 952]; Fleckner v. Dionne (1949), 94 
Cal.App.2d 246 l210 P.2d 530] ; Lammers v. Pacific Elec. Ry. 
Co. (1921), 186 Cal. 379, 384 [199 P. 523]; Howlett v. Doglio 
(1949), 402 Ill. 311 [83 N.E.2d 708, 712]; Tarwater v. 
Atlanta Co., Inc. (1940), 176 Tenn. 510 [144 S.W.2d 746]: 
48 C.J.S. 716-718; see also anno. 44 L.R.A.N.S. 299; 130 
A.L.R. 357-369.) A number of jurisdictions have adopted 
statutes creating a right of action, under specified conditions, 
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against persons furnishing intoxicants. 2 California, however, 
has enacted no such statute notwithstanding the fact that, 
as hereinafter shown, its Legislature has repeatedly dealt 
with problems concerning alcoholic beverages and concerning 
tort liability. 
[2a] Plaintiffs with commendable frankness state in their 
opening brief (p. that they "recognize that it is the general 
rule of law that it is the consumption of the intoxicating 
liquor which is the proximate cause of any subsequent injury 
by reason of such intoxication rather than the sale of in-
toxicating liquor'' (citing Hitson v. Dwyer (1943), supra, 
and Fleckner v. Dionne ( 1949), supra; see also Collier v. 
Stamatis (1945), 63 Ariz. 285 [162 P.2d 125, 127]: "The 
principle is epitomized in the truism that there may be sales 
without intoxication, but no intoxication without drinking"), 
but urge that "knowledge on the part of the defendants 
of the propensities of Cole to seek a quarrel when intoxicated, 
and ... their v,.ilful refusal to heed the pleas of the wife, 
and their wilful insistence in selling intoxicating liquor to 
Cole and allowing him to be intoxicated'' are distinguishing 
factors which support the charge of negligence here and 
establish the sale of the liquor as the proximate cause of the 
injury. Such a view, we conclude in the light of the common 
law, cannot be sustained in this state in the absence of legis-
lative action. 
[3] In the first place, it appears that in Lammers v. Pa-
cific Elec. Ry. Co. (1921), supra, 186 Cal. 379, 384, this 
court stated and relied on the general rule that ''the sale 
of intoxicating liquor is not the proximate cause of injuries 
subsequently received by the purchaser because of his in-
toxication.'' In that case the plaintiff, while intoxicated, was 
ejected from defendant's passenger train; he left the place 
of immediate peril where he was ejected but later returned 
to the tracks at a point about three-quarters of a mile away 
and was seriously injured. The court said: ''The only con-
nection between the ejection and the injury would be the 
fact that if there had been no ejection there would have 
'It appears that such a statute has been adopted in Arkansas, Colo-
rado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Mi~higan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washing-
ton, West Virginia, Wisconsin. (See 48 C.J.S. 717-718, ~ 431; 30 Am. 
Jur. 576, § 612; Ann. Cas. 1917B, p. 534; Black on Intoxicating Liquors, 
§ 277, pp. 326-331; see also 6 A.L.R.2d 798-807.) 
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been no injury. The sale of the whiskey to the plaintiff would 
come nearer being a mate cause of the than 
the ejection from the railway train. The peril arising from 
the ejection ceased the moment the passenger left thr position 
where he could be struck by defendant's trains, while tlw 
peril arising from the usc of the intoxicating liquor contimwd 
in operation up to the time of the injury and contributed 
thereto, and yet it has been uniformly held in the abseneP 
of statute to the contrary that the sale of intoxieating liquor 
is not the proximate eause of injuries subsequently received 
by the purchaser be<~ause of his intoxication (,Joyce on In-
toxicating Utquors, § 421; Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231. 234 [20 
N.E. 73, 3 L.R.A. 327].) ... 'l'lwt the injury was not the 
proximate result of the ejection is demonstrated by the fact 
that the plaintiff was able to, and did in fact, leave the place 
of danger and subsequently of his own volition returned to 
a position of danger on defendant's tracks, and that but for 
plaintiff's action in so returning to a position of danger the 
accident \vou!d not have occurred.'' 
[2b] In the second place, it is to be observed that in 
Fleckner v. Dionne (1949), supra, 94 Cal.App.2d 246, knowl-
edge on the part of the tavernkeeper was. as here, expressly 
averred. The allegations of the complaint there were that 
on the evening in question defendant Dionne, a minor, was 
a patron of the tavern and was sold and given intoxicating 
liquors and allowed to consume them in the tavern; that 
the defendant tavernh:eeper knew that Dionne was a minor 
and sold the liquors to him while he was already under the 
"severe influence of intoxicating liquors"; that he knew 
also that Dionne had upon or ncar the premises an automo-
bile and would thereafter chive it; that defendant knew and 
should have known and foreseen that the driving of the 
automobile by him in his then intoxicated condition could 
and would result in harm and damage to others upon the 
hig·hway; that Dionne while so intoxicated negligently drove 
his automobile into an automobile in which plaintiffs were 
riding and injured them; that the sale and serving of the 
liquor to Dionne by defendant constituted a "negligent dis-
regard of the rights of plaintiffs" whicb joined with Dionne's 
negligence in proximately injurillg plaintiffs. Defendant's 
general demurrer was sustained with leave to amend and on 
plaintiffs' failure to amend jlH1g-ment \Vas entered in defend-
ant's fayor. [4] 'l'lw Distriet Conrt of i\ppral affirmed the 
judgment1 rely iug Ul)()ll the HiL::svn and Lammer::; ea::;es, supra, 
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as well as upon various u>lt-Gf-state decisions, and this court 
denied a hearing.3 Its judgment stands, therefore, as a 
decision of a court of last resort in this state, until and 
unless disapproved by this court or until change of the law 
by legislative action. It is to be noted that the knowledge 
alleged in the Fleckner case was more specific and .extensive 
than that in the instant case. Here it is only alleged that 
defendant knew of the belligerent disposition of the deceased 
when he was intoxicated. 
In the next place, it is to be observed that in Hitson v. 
Dwyer ( 1943), supra, 61 Cal.App.2d 803, it was held that 
one who suffers injuries by reason of his own intoxication 
may not recover from the tavernkeeper by reason of the sale 
of the liquor to the plaintiff. In that case plaintiff alleged 
that while obviously intoxicated and sitting on a movable 
stool at defendants' bar he wrongfully was served intoxicating 
liquor, and as a result he fell from the stool to the floor, 
and was thereafter dragged by defendants from his position 
on the floor; that as a result of the fall or the dragging or 
both, plaintiff was injured. It was held that so far as con-
cerned the fall and any injuries suffered therefrom, the 
proximate cause was the drinking of the liquor rather than 
the wrongful (i.e., in violation of the alcoholic beverage 
control act) sale thereof to an obviously intoxicated person, 
and any wrong in the sale was nonactionable. This court 
denied a hearing. [5] If the man who is injured by reason 
of his intoxicated state may not himself recover from the 
one who provided the liquor, then it follows that under the 
established law governing wrongful death actions, his sur-
vivors may not recover in this, which is such an action. 
(Buckley v. Chadwick (1955), ante, pp. 183, 201 [288 P.2d 
12, 289 P.2d 242]; see also Dernge v. Feierstein (1936), 222 
Wis. 199 [268 N.W. 210, 212] [liquor sale]; Scott v. Green-
3Denial of a hearing is not the equivalent of express approval by 
this court but it has been said that "The order of this court denying a 
petition for a transfer ... after ... decision of the district court 
of appeal may be taken as an approval of the conclusion there reached, 
but not necessarily of all of the reasoning contained in that opinion." 
Eisenberg v. Superior Court (1924), 193 Cal 575, 578 [226 P. 617]; see 
also People v. Rowland (1937), 19 Cal.App.2d 540, 542 [55 P.2d 1333].) 
'l'he significance of a denial in any particular ease is also to be under-
stood as further qualified by the fact that under the Rules on Appeal 
a denial may mean no more than that a ground which we deem ade· 
quate or im~1rllr11t for rorc1cring a hearing has not been brought to our 
attention. (See ruie 2U, Rules on Appeal.) 
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ville Pharmacy (1948), 212 S.C. 485 [48 S.E.2d 8261 
[barbiturate sale]; 30 Am.Jur. 575, § 610.) 
Other cases, from other jurisdictions, relied upon by plain-
tiffs are clearly distinguishable on their facts, even if it be 
assumed that upon similar facts action would lie in Cali-
fornia. For example, Cherbonnier v. Rafalovich ( 1950). 88 
F.Supp. 900, was an action against saloonkeeper;; by one of 
their patrons who, while he was eating in the saloon and 
, / cafe, was attacked by another patron, one Hobson, who was 
drunk. Although dismissing the complaint for failure to 
state a cause of action in that it was not alleged that de-
fendants knew Hobson was of a violent disposition or had 
threatened harm to plaintiff before he was served the last of 
the intoxicating drinks. the court did observe ( p. 903) that 
"The present trend is apparently toward holding the de-
fendant saloonkeeper liable for lawless acts occurring in the 
saloon," and quoted from 30 American Jurisprudence 574. 
section 609, the statement that ''The better reason appears 
to favor placing on the proprietor the duty of seeing to it 
that the patron is not injured either by those in his employ 
or by drunken or vicious men whom he may choose to harbor. 
Further, a guest or patron of such a place has a right to 
rely on the belief that he is in an orderly house and that its 
operator ... is exercising reasonable care to the end that 
the doing·s in the house shall be orderly." Here, if Leonard 
had been injured by Cole (who was the attacker) and if the 
former or his next of kin were the plaintiffs, and if it were 
further alleged that Leonard had been within the defendants' 
premises and was there attacked by Cole, we would then have 
a ease to which the Cherbonnier decision might bf' pertinent. 
Obviously it is not in point on the facts which are alleged. 
Rommel v. Schambacher (1887), 120 Pa. 579 rn A. 779. 
6 Am.St.Rep. 732]; Curran v. Olso11 (1903). 88 Minn. 207 
r92 N.W. 1124, 97 Am.St.Hep. 517. 60 L.RA. 733] ; and 
Peck v. Gerber (1936). 154 Ore. 126 [59 P.2d 675. 106 A.hR. 
996], additionally relied upon by plaintiffs, also involve the 
liability of the saloonkeeper as a proprietor for not using 
reasonable care in maintaining order for the safety of his 
guests. However, as is indicated in the opinions in the cited 
cases as well as in the annotation in 106 American r~aw Re-
ports 1003, following the report of Peck v. Gerber (1936), 
supra, and as recognized by the court in the Cherbonnier case, 
the liability of a saloon keeper in thi~ line 0f ra~es appe;1rs 
to be related to that of iunkeepers aud restaurateurs for 
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to guests or patrons by other guests or persons not 
connected with the management. and is an exception to the 
general common law rule of nonliability of the vendor of 
intoxicating liquor, and furnishes no precedent for imposing 
liability on the saloonkeeper under the circumstances alleged 
in the complaint in this case. 
In Pratt v. Daly (1940), 55 Ariz. 535 [104 P.2d 147, 130 
A.L.R 341], plaintiff wife was permitted to recover damages 
resulting from defendants' sale of intoxicating liquor to her 
husband with knowledge of the fact that the husband was 
an halntual drunkard. Arizona had no civil damage statute. 
The court there, after discussing the rule as stated in Re-
statement of the Law of Torts. volume 3. section 696. that 
''One who, without a physician's direction, sells or otherwise 
supplies to a married woman a habit-forming drug with 
knowledge that it will be used in a way which will cause harm 
to any of the legally protected marital interests of the bus-
band is liable for harm caused by such drug to those interests 
unless the husband consents to the wife's acquisition or use of 
the drug" and that the same rule applies to a sale to the 
husband in an action by the wife under similar circumstances 
(see also 130 A.L.R 352-365). then goes on to observe ( p. 
347 of 130 A.L.R.) : "Of course, since there is not the same 
presumption that the use of liquor will eventually cause the 
loss of volition that there is with a habit-forming drug, it is 
incumbent upon plaintiff to prove that to the knowledge of 
defendant such a stage has been reached by the consumer, 
but if this fact is once established. in all reason and logic the 
right of action should be the same in one case as in the other 
. . . [P. 348.) The allegation of the complaint is that the 
husband of plaintiff was an 'habitual drunkard,' and that 
the fact was well known to defendants. The term 'habitual 
drunkard' has been defined repeatedly, and in almost all 
of the definitions the principal element emphasized is that 
such a person has lost the will power to resist the temptation 
when the liquor is offered him." In Collier v. Stamatis 
( 1945), sttpra, 162 P .2d 125, 126-127, the Arizona court held 
that no cause of action for loss of services lies against a 
tavernkeeper who unlawfully sold intoxicating liquor to a 
child of the age of 15. upon which she became intoxicated, 
because "It cannot be said as a matter of law that a child 
of fifteen has neither will nor choice nor discretion what-
ever"; the court further confirmed that its opinion in the 
4S C.2d-12 
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Pratt v. Daly case rested upon the showing by plaintiff wife 
that her husband was ''incapable of voluntary action.'' (See 
also Cavin v. Smith (1949). 228 lVIinn. :)22 [37 N.W.2d 368. 
369].) By contrast, the plaintiffs in the case now before us 
allege no such lack of volition on the part of the decedent, 
but, rather, that he was an "able-bodied man" who was not 
intoxicated immediately before he entered defendant's estab-
lishment on the day in question. Other cases indicating the 
court's awareness of the materiality of the r"lement of volition 
or of competency, and, henee, of at least contributing re-
sponsibility of the voluntary drinker or user, are Seibel v. 
Leach (1939), 233 Wis. 6() [288 N.W. 774], in which the 
court remarked that "1Jndt'r the eommon law it is not an 
aetionable wrong to sell or to give intoxicating liquors to au 
able-bodied man.'' and affirmed a judgment dismissing the 
complaint; and Scott v. Ureenmlle Pharmacy (1948. S.C.), 
supra, 48 S.E.2d 32±, 327, in which it was pointed out that tlw 
complaint failed to cleseribe plailltiff 's deceased husband "as 
being without mind or Ia•• king in volition." in buying and 
consuming barbiturate capsules during a period of about a 
year, at the end of which time he eommitted suicide by hang-
ing himself, and judgment for defendant, who sold the bar-
biturates, following the sustaining of his demurrer was af-
firmed. (See also :30 Am.Jur. 575-576. § 611.) 
[6, 7] For this court to hold that plaintiffs have here 
stated a cause of action by averring faets which establish 
that no eanse of aetion arose either by statute or by common 
law as the same existed at the time of the events relied upon 
would at the least constitute a departure from its constitu-
tional funetion and an encro:whment upon that of the Legis-
lature. As declared by the eonrt in State v. EI atfielcl ( 1951), 
197 l\Id. 249 [78 A.2d 754. 757], in affirming the judgment 
on demm·rer in defendants' favor in a wrongful death action 
in which plaintiff widow whose husband was killed by an 
intoxicated driver sought damages from tavern owners who 
bad sold the liquor, ''It would be worse than futile for us to 
attempt to convince plaintiff by reason, where all other courts 
have failed and the accumulated mass of authority carries 
no we1ght at alL In the cireumstances of this case ... we 
should virtually usurp legislative power if we should declare 
plaintiff's contentions to be the law of Maryland. In the 
course of the last hundred years there probably has seldom, 
if ever (except during prohibition), been a regnlar session 
of the General Assembly at whic~h no ll<Flc>l' law.:. were passed. 
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On few subjects are legislators kept better informed of legis-
lation in other states. In the face of the flood of civil damage 
laws enacted, amended and repealed in other states and the 
Volstead Act--and of the total absence of authority for such 
liability, apart from statute-the fact that there is now no 
such law in Maryland expresses the legislative intent as 
dearly and compellingly as affirmative legislation would.'' 
(See also Henry Grady Hotel Co. v. Sturgis (1943), 70 Ga. 
App. 879 [28 S.E.2d 329, 338].) 
The significance of legislatiYe action in the light of estab-
lished law and of pertinent judicial decisions has been re-
peatedly recognized in this state. [8] As we have so re-
(•ently said in Buckley v. Chadwick ( 1955), supra, ante, 
pp. 18il, 200 [288 P.2d 12, 289 P.2d 242J, "It is a generally 
accepted principle that in adopting legislation the Legislature 
is presumed to have had knowledge of existing domestic judi-
eial decisions and to have enacted and amended statutes in the 
light of such decisions as have a direct bearing upon them." 
[9] The failure of the Legislature to change the law in a 
particular respeet when the subject is generally before it 
and changes in other respects are made is indicative of an 
intent to leave the law as it stands in the aspects not amended. 
In this connection it should be noted that section 22.2 of the 
Civil Code of this state specifically declares that ''The com-
mon law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to or in-
consistent >Yith the Constitution of the United States, or the 
Constitution or laws of this State, is the rule of decision in 
all the courts of this State." (See also Philpott v. Superior 
Court (1984), 1 Cal.2d 512, 515 [86 P.2d 635, 95 A.L.R. 990]; 
Oin S. Chow v. City of Santa Barbara ( 1933), 217 Cal. 678, 
6D5 [22 P.2d 5]; Munchiando v. Bach (1928), 203 Cal. 457 
[264 P. 762]; Peters v. Peters (1909). 156 Cal. 32,84 [103 P. 
219, 23 L.R.A.N.S. 699] ; 10 Cal.Jur.2d 651-6i'l2, § 2, and cases 
there cited; 23 Cal.Jur. 603.) 
[10] Accordingly, it is to be noted that notwithstanding 
the hoh1ing of this court in Lammers v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co. 
(J 921), supra, 186 Cal. 379, 384; and of the District Court 
of Appeal in Ilitson v. Dwyer (194:3), supra, 61 Cal.App. 
2d 803, 808, and in F'leckner v. Dionne (1949), supra, 94 
Cal.App.2d 246, the r~egislature of California has at no time 
seen fit to adopt a statute incon~istent with the eommon law 
so far as concerns a remedy for injury or death following the 
furnishing of liquor to the orc1inary man. Demonstrat.ing 
awareness by the Legislature of problems relating to the fur-
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nishing and consumption of intoxicating liquors, and a 
similar awareness in respect to problems of tort liability, 
it is _!)Ointed out (without attempting to go back as far as the 
Lammers case, in 1921) that in the 10 years immediately fol-
lowing the decision in the Hitson case (1943) the I,egisla-
ture made numerous changes in statutes governing the sale. 
use, and furnishing of intoxicating liquors c.g., Stats. 
1945, pp. 1023, 2295, 2615: Stats. 1947, pp. 2003. 2051, 2490. 
2791, 2936, 3019, 3025; Stats. 1949. pp. 492, 1546, 1582, 1884. 
2060,2349, 273;); Stats. 1931. pp. 1897,2814, 3051; Stats. 1953, 
pp. 646, 918, 954, 1949, 2084, 334:3) and also in statutes having 
to do with various aspects of tort liability (see e.g., Civ. 
Code, §§43, 43.5(a), 45a, 46, 47. 48, 48a, ·18.5, 171(c), 956. 
1714.5, 1714.6,3341, 3342; Code Civ. Proc., §377), but there 
was no adoption of a statute imposing liability in such a case 
as is now before us. Under such circumstances not only does 
the legislative intent appear to be to maintain, rather than 
to depart from, the pertinent common law, but in the further 
light of the express enactment (Civ. Code, § 22.2) that "The 
common law ... so far as it is not repugnant to or incon-
sistent with the Constitution of the United States, or the Con-
stitution or laws of this State, is the rule of decision in all 
courts of this State,'' it beeomes manifest that the common law 
is the controlling law in this case. (Estate of Apple (1885), 66 
Cal. 432, 434 [6 P. 7] ["where the code is silent, the common 
law governs"]; Estate of Wickes (1900), 128 Cal. 270, 274 [60 
P. 867, 49 L.R.A. 138] ["The common law is the rule of de-
cision in this state, where no positive law, state or national, 
controls"]; Peters v. Peters (1909), supra, 156 CaL 32, 34 
["The common law of England is declared to be the rule of 
decision in all courts of this state, so far as it is not repugnant 
to or inconsistent with our constitution and statutes"] ; see 
also Gray v. Sutherland ( 1954), 124 Cal.App.2d 280, 290 
[268 P.2d 754]; 10 Cal.Jur.2d 652, § 2.) 
[11] Since it is established both by the common law and 
by the decisional law in this state ( 1) that as to a competent 
person it is the voluntary consumption, not the sale or gift, 
of intoxieating liquor which is the proximate cause of injury 
from its use; (2) that the competent person voluntarily con-
suming intoxicating liquor contributes direetly to any injury 
caused thereby; and (3) that contributory negligence of the 
decedent bars recovery by his heirs or next of kin in a wrong-
ful death aetion, the judgment must be, and it is, affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J ., and Traynor, J ,, concurred. 
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::;PENCE, J .-1 concur. 
Further consideration of this case upon rehearing convinces 
me that the governing lavv, as heretofore enunciated by the 
court:;; of this state as well as by the courts of practically 
all other jurisdictions, precludes plaintiff's recovery. I am 
further in agreement with the vie>v expressed in tlw main 
opinion that the establishell rules should be followed until 
such time as these rules may be changed by legislative action. 
I therefore conclude that the trial court properly sustained 
the demurrer, and that the judgment should be affirmed. 
CAH'rEH, J.-I dissent. 
I do not agree with the statement of the majority opmwn 
that the common law so clearly forbids recovery in a case 
such as the one under consideration, or that under the cir-
cumstances here presented the consumption of the liquor, 
rather than its sale, should be considered the proximate cause 
of the drath. For the reasons stated by me in my dissenting 
opinion in th<' case of Buckley v. Chadwick, ante, p. 183 [288 
P.2d 12, 289 P.2d 242], I also disagree with the holding that 
any contributory negligence on the part of a decedent is, or 
should be, a bar to rt'covery by his heirs or next of kin. It fur-
ther appears to me that the holding that plaintiffs' decedent 
was a "compt'tent" person because of plaintiffs' use of the 
phrase '' ablr bodied'' in describing him is outside any of the 
issues here presented. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants knew 
of the decedent's propensities when intoxicated-that ht' was 
dangerous to himst'lf and to others-and that they, with 
such full knowledge, sold alcoholic beverages to him. 
Under the holding of the majority here, a tavern owner 
may escape liability for the death or serious injury of innocent 
third persons by an intoxicated patron when he has fur-
nished intoxicating liquor to such patron after warning by 
both relatives and police that such person should not be 
furnished any intoxicating liquor whatsoever because of his 
vicious propensities when intoxicatt'd. I cannot subscribe 
to such a holding. 
It is true that California has no civil damage, or Dramshop 
Act. (Pleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal.App.2d 246, 249 [210 P.2d 
530].) The question is, therefore, whether, at common law, 
the surviving spouse and children of a decedent had a cause 
of action against one who, with notice, sold intoxicating 
beverages to a patron, and whether the selling, or the drinking, 
358 COLE RusH [45 C.2d 
nf the liquor was the proximate eanse of the snbs0quent 
injuries. 
I am of the opinion that the California cases dealing with 
this problem are distinguishable from the case at bar. 
In the case of Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal.App.2d 803 [143 
P.2d 952], plaintiff alleged that while a patron of the bar. 
and in an obviously intoxicated condition. he was served 
intoxicating liquor as a result of which he fell from the 
movable stool on which he was sitting ; that he was dragged 
from his position on the floor by the defendants. and as a 
result of which, he suffered a fracture and other injuries 
of the shoulder and body. He contended that the defendants. 
knowing his condition, negligently failed to take precautions 
to protect him. Plaintiff relied in part upon the Alcoholic 
Beverage Act (Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 3796, § 62, 
Stats. 1935, p. 1123) which makes it a misdemeanor to sell 
alcoholic beverages to an ''obviously intoxicated person.'' 
'l'he court held that it could not be said that trw purpose of 
the act was to protect an obviously intoxicated person, as 
the act itself declared ( § 1) that the purpose was to promote 
" in the highest degree the economic, social and moral 
well-being and the safety of the State and of all its people." 
It was also held that "The principle that a violation of a 
statute or ordinance is negligence per se, is subject to the 
limitation that the act or omission must proximately cause 
or contribute to the injury. (Burtt v. Bank of Cali forma 
National Association, 211 Cal. 548 [296 P. 68] ; Lawrence v. 
Sonthern Pac. Co., 189 Cal. 434 [208 P H66].) Fnless the 
alleged violation of the Beverage Act by defendants con-
stituted the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries such vio-
lation is wholly immaterial to a disposition of this appeal." 
'l'he court continued to state the ''general rule'' as follows: 
"Hather we find the general rule to be as stated in the case 
of Elyba v. C . .tL Elornernan, Inc., 302 Ill.App 143 [23 N.E.2d 
564 J : 'The common law gave no remedy for the sale of liquor 
either on the tlwory that it was a direct wrong or on the 
ground that it was negligence, which would impose a legal 
liability on the seller for damages resulting from intoxiea-
tion.' '' and that the rule found support in the ease of 
Lammers v. Pacific Elcc. Ry. Co., 186 CaL 379 [199 P. 523], 
wherein the court held that the sale of intoxicating liquor 
is not the proximate cause of injuries subsequently received 
by the purchaser beeaww of his intoxication. "'l'herefore, in 
the absence of a showing to the contrary, the proximate cause 
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is not the wrongful sale of the liquor but the drinking of the 
liquor so purchased." 
The case of F'leckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal.App.2d 246 [210 
P.2d 530], was an action brought, in part, against the owner~ 
of a tavern. [t was allrged that these defendants had sold 
intoxicating liquors to one Dionne, a minor. knowing that 
he was alrt>ady intoxicated and lmmYing that he would drive 
his car in an intoxicatrcl condition which could, and would. 
result in harm to otbers using the highway; that Dionnr. 
in an intoxieat(•d condition. dicl drive his car so negligently 
and recklessly tl1at be caused it to eollide with the car in 
which plaintiffs wrre riding to their injury and damage: 
that all of said injury and damage was the direct and proxi-
mate result of the "unlawfnlness, negligenee. recklessness of 
the defendants" in selling the intoxicating liquor to the 
obviously intoxicated minor, Dionne. 
Tlw court cited both the Lamnwrs and Hitsou ease:s and 
held that in both of them the language in re proximate cause 
was not neces:sary to the decision since in the Lammers casr 
the statement "it has been uniformly held in the absence 
of stattde to the contrary that the sale of intoxicating liquor 
is not the proximate eanse of injuries subsequently received 
by the purchaser beeanse of his intoxication'' was qualified 
by the words ''in the absence of statute to the contrary'' and 
in the Hitson case the actionable wrong was the dragging 
of plaimifl' across the floor. (Emphasis added.) 
'fhe court cited Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66 [288 N.W. 774] 
where the adion was for proprrty damage and personal 
injuries bronght by a third person against the defendant 
tavern owner for selling intoxicants to one Leach who drove 
his car in such a manner as to cause plaintiff's injuries and 
damage. fn the \Visconsin (:asc. the court relied upon Dernge 
v. F'eier·stein, 222 Wis. 199 1268 N.W 210] which was an 
action brought by a widow whose hnsbancl had been sold 
intoxicants by tavern owners after she had given them notice 
not to let her bn~baud haw any more liquor. After leaving 
the taYcrn, her husband lost control of his car and was 
fatally injured. 'l'he court there held that there was no cause 
of action at common law against a vendor of liquor in favor 
of those injured by the intoxication of the vendee (Black, 
Law of Intoxicating Liquors, ch. 13, § 281; Buntin v. Hutton, 
206 Ill.App. 194; Healey v. Cady, 104 Vt. 463 (161 A. 151]; 
Coy v. Cntting. 138 Kan. 109 [23 P.2r1 458] ; State v. Johnson, 
23 S.D. 293 Ll21 N.W. 785, 22 hR.A.N.S. 1007] ; Kraus 
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v. Schroeder, 105 Neb. 809 l182 N.W. 364, 365] ). The 
California court concluded that in the absence of civil damage 
legislation in this state, and with such views as have been 
expressed by our courts on the subject (Lammers and Hitson 
cases) coinciding with the holdings in other jurisdictions 
where the questions have been passed upon, ''we are satisfied 
that the sustaining of the demurrer of respondent Pangracs 
was correct. '' 
Mr. ,Justice Dooling dissented. He admitted frankly that 
cases from some other jurisdictions were to the effect that 
in the absence of statute no remedy existed against the dis-
penser of liquor for injuries resulting to third persons from 
the acts of intoxicated persons. "However. consider0d as 
questions of the law of negligence and proximate cause, I 
cannot bow to the r·easoning of those decisions when carried 
to the fnll extreme of holding that under no circumstances 
can one who dispenses liquor to another knowing that he is 
becoming intoxicated be liable to a third person later injured 
by the intoxieated person's conduct; and I can see no reason 
for perpetuating in the law of this statE' the error of the 
courts of other jurisdictions 
"Negligence is mE'asured by what a person of ordinary 
prudence would or would not do under the same or similar 
circumstances and it is thoroughly settled that negligence 
may be the proximate cause of an in}1try to another even 
though the act of a third per·son intervenes, 1f a person of 
ordinary prudence could reasonably anticipate the probability 
of the third per-son's intervemng eoncltwt. ( JJeEvoy v. Amer-
ican Pool Corp., 32 Ca1.2d 285, 299 et sE'q. [195 P.2d 783] ; 
Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 26 Cal.2d 213, 218 et seq. [157 
P.2d 372, 158 A.L.R. 872] ; Katz v. Helbing, 215 CaL 448 
[10 P.2d 1001].)" (Emphasis added.) 
Both the Fleckner and Hitson eases allegE'd no more than 
negligence in serving liquors; in the present case, plaintiff 
wife alleges that "on oecasions too numerous to name [she] 
requested defendants and each of them not to give, sell or 
furnish intoxicating beverages to James Bernard Cole suffi-
cient to allow him to become intoxicated'' but that defendants 
refused to desist from selling Cole intoxicating beverages; 
and that defendants had spec1fie knowledge that when Cole 
became intoxicated he was invariably belligerent and quarrel-
some. In the Hitson case, the plaintiff was suing for his 
own injuries reeeived whilE' he was intoxieated; in the Fleclmer 
case, a third person was suing for injuries reeeived by reason 
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of the of an automobile an intoxicated person. 
In neither case were the surviving spouse and dependent 
children suing for loss of consortium and support; aud in 
neither ease did the defendant tavern owner have prior 
specific notice and knowledge of the effect of liquor on the 
patron to whom the intoxicants \Yere sold. 
In ·woollen and Thornton "I1aw of Intoxicating Liquors" 
(vol. II, § 1029, p. 1837) it is said: "The right of persons 
injuriously affected by the sale of intoxicating liquors to 
recover damages is not entirely restricted to the n:ght given 
them by statute. In several jurisdictions it has been held 
that when, by the continued sale of intoxicating liquors, a 
person has been unable to perform the duties owing by him 
to another, under the common law, the seller was liable in 
damages to persons to whom the duty was owing for any 
loss that he thereby sustained (Holleman v Harward, 119 
N.C. 150 [25 S.E. 972, 56 Am.St.Rep. 672, 34 L.R.A. 803] : 
''It is lawful to sell laudanum as a medicine. It is also 
lawful to sell spirituous liquors as a beverage upon the 
dealers complying with the license laws, except in the cases 
prohibited by statute. Certainly no fair inference can be 
drawn from this that damages may not be recovered from 
one who knowingly and willfully sells or gives laudanum or 
intoxicating liquors to a wife. in such quantities as to be 
attended by such consequences to the wife as are set out in 
the complaint in this action.") However. it may be stated 
as a general rule, that unless the rights of persons having 
pecnliar interests in the buyers of intoxicating liquors such 
as a wife in her httsband, or parent in the child, are invaded 
by the sales of intoxicating liqtwrs and the seller of such 
liquors has notice of the in.furious effects of the liquors so 
sold upon the buyer (Holleman v. Harward, supra; Hoard 
v. Peck, 56 Barb. (N.Y.) 201 [opium!; Struble v. Nodwift, 
11 Ind. 64), the right to recover damages for injuries re-
sulting from the sales of intoxicating liquors is purely statu-
tory, and the action is governed entirely by the provisions 
of the statute." (Emphasis added. l 
In Peck v. Gerber (1936). 154 Ore. 126 [59 P.2d 675. 106 
A.L.R. 996], in which it appears that the plaintiff was as-
saulted in the saloon by another customer. the latter being 
a regular customer who was known to the saloonkeeper to 
be a trouble-maker. the court held the saloonkeeper liable, 
because he was negligent. and expressed the view that he 
did not use the care required of the ordinarily prudent man 
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in maintaining order for the safety of his guc>sts. The court 
stated that the standard of care (loes not vary, but that the 
ordinarily prudent man c'xereiscs care comnwnsnrate with the 
dang·ers to be avoided and the likelihood of danger to othrrs. 
Tlwre is. appar(~ntly, no statute in Oregon on which recovery 
rould havP been prediratcd. Other ra;;;ps in whi(·h thr saloon-
keeper was held liablr nnder somewhat similar f'ireumstances 
are Mastacl v Swedish Brethren. il:1 Minn. 40 [85 N.W. 913. 
R5 Am.St.I{ep. 446. 53 L.R.A. i\081 and Molloy v Coletti, 
114 Misc. 177 [186 N.Y.S. 730[ In Curran v Olson, 88 Minn. 
:307 [92 N.W. 1124. !)7 Am.St.Rep 517. 60 L.R.A. 7:33], 
where the factual situation was different. the court said: 
" . the bartender knew. or mig·ht have known by the 
exerrise of the slightt'st care, what th0 alcohol was to be used 
for. and could havr prevented thE' injury to the plaintiff." 
[n Cher·bonnwr v. Rafalovich (Alaska). 88 F'.Supp. 900, 
the court granted leave to plaintiff to plead over to allege, 
if he could. that tht' saloonk<>epPr had knowledge of the 
patron's violent disposition whilt' under the infinence of 
intoxieating beverages Here. thP eourt pointed out (p. 903) 
that: "The prest'nt trt'nd is apparrntly toward holding the 
defendant saloonkeeper liable for lawless acts occurring in 
tht' saloon. It is said in 30 Am .• Jur. 574 that: 'The better 
reason appears to favor placing on the proprietor the duty 
of seeing to it that the patron is not injured eithrr by those 
in thr employ or by drunken or viciom. men whom he may 
choose to harbor. Further, a guest or patron of such a place 
has a right to rely on the bf'lief that he is in an orderly 
honse and that tht' operator. personally or by his delegated 
representative, is exercising reasonable cart' to the end that 
the doings of the house shall be orderly' " 
[ t wonld seem from the foregoing that the rule of the com-
mon law with t·espect to intoxicating beverages is not quite 
.~o clearly defined in favor of nonliability as would appear 
from stat<>nwnts found in other cases, and textbooks, as well 
as in tht' majority opinion. 
Plaintiffs next contend that the rule of the common law 
with respect to habit forming drugs should be controlling 
here. At common law. it was held that a wife could bring 
an action against ont' who sold habit forming drugs to a 
husband with lmowledgt' that the drug was intended to 
satisfy a craving induced by habitua I use ( F1 oard v. Peck. 
56 Barb rN.Y.) 202: Hnllrrnan \' Harwanl. 119 N.C. 150 
[25 S.E. 972, 56 Am.St.RE>p. 672, 34 L.R.A. 803]; Flander-
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rneyer v. Cooper, 85 Ohio St. 327 [98 N.E. 102, Ann.Cas. 
1913A 983, 40 L.R.A.N.S. 360] [morphine] ; Moberg v. Scott, 
38 S.D. 422 [161 N.W 998, L.R.A. 1917D 7321 [opium]; Tidd 
v Skinner, 225 N.Y. 422 [122 N.E. 447, 3 A.L.R. 1145] 
[morphine]) 
In Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. i535 [104 P.2d 147, 130 A.L.R. 
il4 l J ( i1• Arizona there is no civil damage act) it was held 
that (!efendant vendor of intoxicating liquors was liable to 
the plaintiff wife after selling sueh liquors over her protest 
and with knowledge that the plaintiff's llnsband was an 
habitual drunkard and had reached sueh a state that his 
power to drink or not as he chose had been destroyed. The 
eourt concluded that the defendants had breached a duty 
owing to the plaintiff for which the plaintiff should be com-
pensated in damages. 
A note in Southern California [,aw Heview ( 14 :91) points 
out that at common law. a vendor was liable to one spouse 
for a sale to the other spouse, or to a parent for a sale to 
a minor child of habit-forming drugs to the extent of the 
damages suffered by the loss of eonsortium or the services 
of the vietim of the drugs, if the vendor knew or had reason 
to know that the drugs were to be used for a purpose 
harmful to the purehaser. The doctrine stems from the hus-
band's common law cause of aetion against one who injures 
the husband's wife and thereby causes the husband expense 
and loss of consortium (21 A.hR. 1517' and from the wife's 
similar cause of action ( 5 A.L.R. 1049: 59 A.L.R. 680) 
recognized subsequent to her right to sue in her own name 
as created by the various Married Women's Acts (see Cal. 
Code Civ. Proc., ~ 370). Thr doctrine would now seem to 
have acquired the dignity of a status distinct from its parPnt 
action (Rest. Torts, §§ 696. 6fl7. 705; 17 Am .• Jur .. Drugs & 
Druggists, 864, ~ 34), especially in view of its application 
to parent and ehild. 
'rhe author of the artiele points out that there should be 
no reason to distinguish between habit-forming drugs and 
intoxicating liquors since both have two important ebarae-
teristics in common: ( 1) Their use in substantial quantities 
causes injury to the mind and body: and (2) after reaehing 
a certain point in their use, a person can no longer control 
his appetite for them. (As to the general pharmaeologieal 
problem, see The Action of Alcohol on Man [ 1923]. Ernest 
H. Starling: The Opium l 'l'oLlem I 1028]. Charles E. Terry 
and Mildred Pellens; U. ::3. Txea:mry De1ntrtment, Bureau of 
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Narcotics, Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs 
[1938].) 
In the Pratt case, supra, the court said: ''A careful study 
of the cases following the principle laid dowu in Hoard v. 
Peck, supra, will show that the upon which they 
were based is that there are certain substances which, if 
used habitually, the volition of the user to such an 
extent that he has no power to but consume them vvhen 
they are placed before him; that the consumption and the 
sale of such substances are, therefore, merged and become 
the act of the vendor; the sale is, therefore, the proximate 
cause of the loss of consortium, and the consumer cannot, 
having lost his volition to act, be guilty of contributory 
negligence. The best known of these substances is opium and 
its various derivatives, but it is a well-known scientific fact 
that many other things, under certain circumstances, will 
produce the same result. Cocaine is an instance among the 
drugs, and it is equally well established that the excessive 
use of intoxicating liquor may, and frequently does, have 
the same effect. We think it would be a narrow and illogical 
limitation of the rule to hold that because one habit-forming 
substance is a 'drug' in the technical sense of the term, and 
another is a 'liquor,' different rules should be applied to the 
sale and use thereof. In fact, there is no specific hold-
ing applying such limitation in any of the recorded cases, 
and in Holleman v. Harward, supra, the court intimated 
strongly that under certain circumstances intoxicating liquor 
might fall within the same rule as laudanum as a habit-
forming substance. Of course, since there is not the same 
presumption that the use of liquor will eventually cause the 
loss of volition that there is with a habit-forming drug, it 
is incumbent upon plaintiff to prove that to the knowledge 
of defendant such a stage has been reached by the consumer, 
but if this fact is once established, in all reason and logic 
the right of action should be the same in one case as in the 
other. \V e are satisfied from our examination of the cases 
that the language of the Restatement, S1tpra (Torts, vol. 3, 
p. 696) 'c. The expression "habit-forming drugs" as used 
in this section does not include intoxicating liquor,' was 
not meant as a declaration that the decided cases exclude 
liquors from the rule, for no such cases have been cited to us, 
but rather is merely a recognition of the fact that the precise 
issue had not yet been presented to and determined by any 
court.'' The court frankly admitted that: ''Every requested 
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of the common law to a new set 
of circumstances is originally without precedent, and some 
court must be the first one to make the proper application. 
"In answer to the second contention (judicial legislation), 
we are not asked to make a law. \Ve are asked to declare 
what the common law is and has been, and a declara-
us that it has always such an action, even 
none has ever actually been brought, is no more legis-
lation than would be a declaration that it does not. 
''So far as the bringing of unwarranted actions is con-
if the facts do not show the action is justified, we 
must assume that the trial court and jury will properly apply 
the law, and we may not refuse to declare it correctly merely 
because there are some who may attempt to apply it to 
cases where the facts do not sustain it. 
''On a careful review of all the authorities and a con-
sideration of well-known scientific facts, we think that under 
the rationale of the rule laid down in Hoard v. Peck, supra, 
and the cases following it, the sale of intoxicating liquors 
under the circumstances indicated above is subject to the 
same rule as the sale of what is, in the strict sense of the 
word, a habit-forming 'drug,' and that under such circum-
stances an action for the sale of th0 former should be upheld 
as allowed by the common law as well as the latter." 
In Swanson v. Ball, 67 S.D. 161 [290 N.W. 482, 483], 
there was no dramshop act involved. The court there was 
concerned with facts substantially the same as the ones here 
under consideration. Plaintiff's husband was alleged to have 
died after drinking liquor sold to him by defendants who 
admitted receiving both oral and written notice from plain-
tiff to refrain from doing so. Defendants appealed from an 
order overruling their demurrer to plaintiff's complaint. The 
court, in afiirming, said: "We are not impressed with the 
argument presented in which the appellant has attempted 
to differentiate between the opium drug in the case of Moberg 
v. Scott, St{pra [161 N.W. 998], and the intoxicating liquor 
in the instant case. This court through its former decisions, 
which we have just referred to, has quite conclusively estab-
lished that a complaint such as we are considering states a 
cause of action. The right of the wife to the consortium of 
the husband is one of her personal rights and we believe that 
the allegations of the complaint are sufficient in both state-
ments, as to facts and form, to permit a trial upon the 
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merits. The court also held that the wife had a cause of 
action ''independent of any specific statute.'' 
So far as the rationale of the decided cases is concerned-
that the consumption and not the sale of the liquor is the 
proximate cause of the injury received by the third person-
it appears clear that under the circumstances of this case, 
the sale and consumption were so merged as to become one 
act and under the rule that individuals must be held to have 
contemplated the natural and probable result of their own 
acts purposely and intentionally committed it is unrealistic 
to say that the act of the deceased in drinking the liquor 
and thereafter becoming belligerent and pugilistic was not 
a foreseeable consequence of the sale by defendant. (See 
23 So.Cal.hRev. 420, 421.) This court has held many times 
that negligence may be the proximate cause of an injury 
even though the act of a third person intervenes, if a person 
of ordinary prudence could reasonably anticipate the prob-
ability of the third person's intervening conduct (Richardson 
v. Ham, 44 Cal.2d 772 [285 P.2d 269] ; Anstin v. Riverside 
Portland Cement Co., 44 Cal.2d 225 [282 P.2d 69]; McEvoy 
v. American Pool Corp., 32 Cal.2d 295, 299 [195 P.2d 783] ; 
Mosley v. Arden Parrns Co., 26 Cal.2d 213, 218 [157 P.2d 
372, 158 A.L.R. 872]; Katz v. Helbing, 215 Cal. 449 [10 P.2d 
1001], and others) . 
It appears to me that under the facts alleged by plain-
tiffs it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to sus-
tain the defendants' demurrer without leave to amend. 
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment. 
